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TARGETED KILLING AND THE COURTS: A RESPONSE
TO ALAN DERSHOWITZ
JameelJafferl
Weeks after 9/11, Alan Dershowitz notoriously proposed that
judges be empowered to issue warrants authorizing interrogators to
use torture against suspected terrorists.' His theory was that
government interrogators would torture prisoners whether or not
court's authorized them to, and that, given this "fact," it would be
better to regulate torture than to leave it unregulated. He argued
that allowing interrogators to apply for torture warrants before
using methods that would otherwise be illegal would make the
practice of torture more visible to the public, allow interrogators to
use torture without fear of criminal prosecution, and limit the use
of torture to state-sanctioned methods. ("A sterilized needle
underneath the nail might be one such approved method,"
Professor Dershowitz suggested helpfully.)
Dershowitz provoked many people but persuaded few, and the
ACLU was among the civil liberties organizations that criticized his
proposal. But since the ACLU filed a suit challenging the Obama
administration's asserted authority to carry out the targeted killing
of a U.S. citizen,' Dershowitz has seen inconsistency in the ACLU's
argument that the Obama administration's targeted killing
t Director, ACLU Center for Democracy. The author was lead counsel to
the plaintiff in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I *D.D.C. 2010), a case
concerning the scope of the government's authority to carry out targeted killings
of U.S. citizens. The district court dismissed the ACLU's complaint in Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama on the grounds that the plaintiff (the father of a U.S. citizen on the
government's targeted-killing list) did not have standing to assert his son's rights
and that the questions of whether and in what contexts the government could
carry out the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen were political questions beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts.
1. Alan Dershowitz, The Case for Torture Warrants, ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ,
http://www.alandershowitz.com/publications/docs/torturewarrants.html (last
visited May 2, 2011).
2. Id.
3. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1.
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program should be subject to judicial review.' How can killing
warrants be a good idea, he asks, if torture warrants are not? He
writes:
The ACLU has now brought a lawsuit on behalf of
[Anwar] Al-Awlaki's father demanding that before Al-
Awlaki can be targeted for military action, the government
must "disclose the criteria that are used in determining
whether the government will carry out the targeted killing
of a US citizen." It is also demanding that the government
present evidence of "concrete, specific and imminent
threats to life or physical safety, and there are no means,
other than legal force, that could reasonably be employed
to neutralize the threats."
Think about this! What the ACLU is now seeking is, in
effect, a "killing warrant." They are demanding, as a
precondition to targeted killing, essentially the same
mechanism that I have sought as a precondition to the
imposition of nonlethal torture.
Dershowitz misunderstands both our lawsuit and our
opposition to torture warrants. Our opposition to torture warrants
is based not on an objection to judicial supervision of torture, but
on an objection to torture itself. The ACLU has always taken the
position that torture should be proscribed categorically-and,
under existing law, it is. Torture is outlawed by the Geneva
67
Conventions and by the Convention Against Torture,' which the
United States signed in 1988.8 Under domestic law torture is a
crime punishable by life in prison;9 in some circumstances, it is a
war crime.'o The existing law reflects ajudgment (which the ACLU
shares) that torture is always inhumane-that it denies the
humanity of the prisoner and erodes the humanity of the
torturer-and that there are means that even the most laudable
ends can neverjustify. In a celebrated decision of the United States
4. Alan Dershowitz, The ACLU Demands "Killing Warrants", THE HUFFINGTON
PosT (Nov. 23, 2010, 3:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-
dershowitz/the-aclu-demands-killing-_b_787527.html.
5. Id.
6. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3
& 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
7. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
8. Id.
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2010).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (a)-(d) (2010).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, those who perpetrate
torture are labeled hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."
But while torture is categorically prohibited, the use of lethal
force is not. In wartime, states can permissibly use lethal force
against enemy soldiers. Outside the context of armed conflict,
government agents-and the rest of us-can permissibly use lethal
force in self-defense or defense of others." It is true that the
circumstances in which the government can permissibly use lethal
force without charge or trial are narrow: except in zones of armed
conflict, lethal force can be used only as a last resort, and only to
address threats that are imminent. But the point is that the
government's use of lethal force-unlike its use of torture-is not
always unlawful. Professor Dershowitz acknowledges this
distinction but misses its import.
Because the government is not categorically prohibited from
using lethal force, it makes sense to ask what standards will control
the use of lethal force, and who will decide whether the standards
are satisfied in any particular instance. The central proposition of
the ACLU's legal challenge was that the courts have a role to play
in articulating the standards under which lethal force is used and
in ensuring that the government actually complies with those
standards. We rejected the Obama administration's argument that
the President's authority to order the targeted killing of suspected
terrorists-including American citizens-is entirely unreviewable:
The government's brief seeking the dismissal of this case
runs to nearly sixty pages but can be summed up in a
single sentence: No court should have any role in
establishing or enforcing legal limitations on the
executive's authority to use lethal force against U.S.
citizens whom the executive has unilaterally determined
to pose a threat to the nation. The government has
clothed its bid for unchecked authority in the doctrinal
language of standing, justiciability, equity, and secrecy,
11. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. See generally Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REv. RED
CROs 991 (2008) available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-
872-reports-documents.pdf.
13. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372 (2007). Some jurisdictions also allow the death penalty, but the legitimacy of
that practice is contested, including by the ACLU. See Capital Punishment, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
14. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
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but the upshot of its arguments is that the executive,
which must obtain judicial approval to monitor a U.S.
citizen's communications or search his briefcase, may
execute that citizen without any obligation to justify its
actions to a court or to the public. While the Constitution
designates the President Commander-in-Chief of the
nation's armed forces, it does not provide him with a
blank check over the lives of its citizens. 5
To say that the courts have a role to play, though, is not to say
that judges should be empowered to issue killing warrants, and
while others have proposed that judges oversee the government's
real-time targeting decisions, the ACLU has not. The reason is
that, except in zones of armed conflict, the government's authority
to use lethal force is limited to circumstances in which a prior-
warrant requirement would be unworkable-circumstances in
which there is not time for a court to weigh the evidence." A
warrant requirement might make sense if the government had
sweeping authority to carry out the targeted killing of anyone,
anywhere, who might at some point in the future present a threat
to the country. But it does not have this kind of authority, and it
should not. (Indeed, if the government had that authority, it could
dispense with criminal trials altogether by summarily executing
criminal suspects instead.)
Professor Dershowitz is right about one thing: the courts
should play a role in overseeing the targeted killing program. They
should do this by articulating the legal standards under which the
government can permissibly use lethal force against individuals
who have not been charged with crimes, and by reviewing, after
15. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and In Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, No. 10-cv-01469, 2010 WL 4974323, (D. D.C. Oct. 8, 2010).
16. See, e.g., Vicki Divoll, Op-Ed, U.S. Targets an American Abroad: Should the
Executive Branch be Allowed to Put a Citizen on a CIA Death List Without judicial
Review?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com
/2010/apr/23/opinion/la-oe-divoll-20100423; Editorial, Lethal Force Under Law,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10
/opinion/Osunl.html; Editorial, Our View on War on Terror: Yes, the U.S. Can Seek to
Kill an American Terrorist Abroad, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-11-16-editoriall6_ST
N.htm.
17. See generally Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28,
2010) (by Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr.org
/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.
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lethal force has been used, whether the government has complied
with the legal standards. (American courts are already familiar with
this framework because it is the framework used whenever an
individual alleges that government agents used excessive force.)
Empowering courts to issue killing warrants is neither necessary
nor advisable-which is why the ACLU has not proposed it.
18. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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